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When deciding whether to allow a taking of property we need
to ask what we want property rights to do
Douglas C Harris*
In 2017, the strata corporation at The Hampstead, a 4-storey apartment building in
Vancouver’s West End, called a vote on a proposal to wind-up the strata
corporation, terminate the individual strata lots, and convert the strata lot owners
to co-owners of the whole. The catalyst for the vote was a developer’s offer that, if
accepted, would see the owners receive more than twice the assessed value of their
strata lots.1 The owners of 27 of the 33 strata lots voted in favour of dissolution. In
another vote, they approved the collective sale.2
The developer’s offer precipitated the dissolution vote, but other factors
were involved, including the prospect of expensive renovations to the 30-year old
building, the city’s decision to allow higher density developments in the
neighbourhood,3 and the province’s amendment of the Strata Property Act to lower
the approval threshold for dissolution votes from unanimous consent to 80
percent.4 The Hampstead vote met this lower 80 percent threshold, by one vote.
The reduced approval threshold facilitates the dissolution of strata property
and, in doing so, enhances the capacity of owners, such as those at The Hampstead,
to maximize the exchange value of their interests. However, abandoning the
presumption that dissolution requires unanimous consent also makes it more likely
that dissenting owners will have their property taken from them involuntarily.
In recognition of the dangers inherent to a regime that enables a majority of
owners to terminate the individual property interests of a dissenting minority, the
Strata Property Act requires that strata corporations secure court confirmation of
dissolution votes.5 Not surprisingly, the shift to a lower dissolution threshold, the
rapidly rising land values in British Columbia’s urban centres, and the increased costs
of maintaining aging buildings, have precipitated a growing number of dissolution
votes and a steady flow of applications to the British Columbia Supreme Court
(BCSC) to confirm the votes.
The first two applications to confirm dissolution votes were uncontested,
even though a number of owners had voted against dissolution in each instance.6
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Since then, the BCSC has heard two contested applications. Justice Milman denied
the first, ruling in an application from the strata corporation at Bel-Ayre Villa that a
procedural flaw invalidated the vote.7 In doing so, he described non-consensual
dissolution as “an involuntary taking of a home,” and ruled that statutes that
authorize the taking of property must be interpreted strictly.8 In this case, the
procedural failing, although apparently not causing prejudice to the dissenting
owners, nullified the vote.9 Strata corporations had to follow the statutory
requirements for dissolution to the letter because non-consensual dissolution
produced a taking of property.10
In the second contested application—that of the strata corporation at The
Hampstead—Justice Loo confirmed the dissolution vote.11 In her reasons for
decision, Justice Loo indicated that the statutory dissolution framework “balances
various legal rights, so that property rights are not to be given priority over other
legal rights.”12 She is correct that the courts must balance competing interests when
considering contested strata property cases, but pitting “property rights” against
“other legal rights” misconstrues the choice that confronts the courts.
First, it is not clear what Justice Loo means by “other legal rights.” Strata
property owners hold a private interest (usually a fee simple estate) in a separately
identified parcel of land, a share of the common property, and a right to participate
in the governance of the private and common property. This package of interests
and an obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the common property are the
essential features of strata property. The rights to participate in strata governance,
including the capacity to vote on dissolution, are not “other legal rights” that need
to be balanced against property rights; they are part of the strata property package.
Similarly, the wish to maximize the exchange value of a property interest
does not fall within the category of “other legal rights”. It is simply a desire that
must be weighed against the desire to remain in a home. As a result, where
dissenting owners contest the dissolution of strata property, the task for the court is
to determine what the institution of property protects. Justice Loo comes closer to
identifying the issue when she concludes:
… I do not agree that property rights as a home should be given greater
emphasis in the face of 80% or more of the owners who want to take
advantage of the increased profit to be made as a result of rezoning and
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redevelopment, particularly when the preponderance of the evidence is
that the owners who want to remain living in the community can do so.13

The question in contested strata property dissolution cases is whether
property rights in land protect “home” or the ability “to take advantage of the
increased profit”. In the words of one of the owners, does The Hampstead provide
him a “home for the rest of his life”,14 or is it, in the words of another, “a hugely
valuable commodity”?15
When courts grapple with this question, the Strata Property Act directs them
to consider “the best interests of the owners” and whether confirming or not
confirming the dissolution vote might cause “significant unfairness” or create
“significant confusion and uncertainty.”16 In most cases, the first two
considerations—“best interests” and “significant unfairness”—will require the
closest judicial attention, and the analysis of these standards should begin with
recognition that to confirm non-consensual dissolution is to authorize the capacity
of a majority of owners to take the property of a dissenting minority.
In considering “best interests”, if the starting point is that non-consensual
dissolution results in the taking of property, then the courts should not simply
equate “best interests” with “the greatest good for the greatest number.” The
courts have generated the “greatest good for the greatest number” standard in
disputes over the use and management of common property.17 While it may be an
appropriate framework to resolve disputes over common property, the taking of
individual interests in land requires more attention to individual circumstances and
interests, particularly of those who confront involuntary dispossession and the loss
of home. In short, the courts should not consider an 80 percent vote to have
determined the best interests of the owners. It may be evidence of best interests,
but should not be determinative.
Turning to “significant unfairness”, if the non-consensual dissolution of strata
property is understood to include a taking of property from dissenting owners, then
courts should begin with the presumption that non-consensual dissolution creates
significant unfairness. Indeed, the potential unfairness in the taking of property is
the basis for the common law rule that statutes that authorize a taking must be
strictly construed. This presumption of unfairness to a dissenting minority would
place a burden on the proponents of dissolution to establish either that the taking
would not create significant unfairness, or that not to allow the taking of property
would create greater unfairness.
Justice Loo’s conclusion, based principally it appears on evidence led by the
proponents of dissolution at The Hampstead, that there would not be significant
unfairness because the involuntarily dispossessed owners could purchase other
property the same neighbourhood—“all of the owners should be able to acquire
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comparable units in the West End”18—appears to recognize that the burden to
establish unfairness will be shared.
Non-consensual dissolution of strata property results in the taking of
property from dissenting owners. This should be the starting point for the courts as
they turn their attention to considerations of “best interest” and “significant
unfairness” and, in the case of residential land, to the question of whether property
rights should protect home or the capacity to maximize exchange value.
In making this choice, the courts must be attentive to context. Indeed,
determining “best interests” and “significant unfairness” requires attention to the
circumstances of individual owners, and this necessarily involves consideration of
context. At present, two factors should receive particular attention.
First, the shift away from the presumption that dissolution required
unanimous consent has fundamentally altered the terms of strata property
ownership. At least in the near term, this significant and retroactive change should
bear on how the courts interpret owner expectations. Justice Loo’s assertion that
“[r]easonable expectations are not static,” and her conclusion that the owners at
The Hampstead could not have “reasonably expected to live in their units as long as
they wanted, or for the rest of their lives,” unduly minimizes the degree and
significance of the shift in what it means to be an owner within strata property.19
Before the amended dissolution provisions, it was entirely reasonable for strata
property owners to expect that the termination of their strata lots required their
consent. Non-consensual dissolution was possible, but difficult and rare. Indeed, this
was a prominent justification for the lower dissolution vote threshold.20 The courts
should not minimize the degree of the change, or suggest that prior, well-founded
expectations were somehow unreasonable.
Second, there is broad awareness that the rapidly rising cost of land in British
Columbia’s urban centres, particularly Vancouver, has dramatically reduced the
affordability of housing. There is much less agreement about whether the solutions
to the affordability crisis lie in efforts to enhance the supply of housing, or to reduce
land speculation, or both.21 However, while governments at different levels grapple
with broad policy choices, the courts have a more clearly defined, yet nonetheless
difficult choice in reviewing contested strata property dissolution votes: does
ownership within strata property protect the capacity to remain an owner or to
maximize the exchange value? In determining which construction of property is in
the owners’ best interests and does not create significant unfairness, the courts
must address the availability of affordable housing. At a minimum, the current crisis
should give them pause before they move too quickly to countenance the taking of
existing homes by confirming the non-consensual dissolution of strata property.
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